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There has recently been a rebellion within the ranks of analytic philosophy. It 
has come to be appreciated that, in the debate between Russell and Meinong, 
Russell was perhaps mistaken in his criticisms and Meinong was perhaps 
correct in his views. As a consequence, an attempt was made to rehabilitate 
the Meinongian position, to defend it against the most obvious attacks and 
to develop it in the most plausible ways. T. Parsons was among the first of 
the contemporary philosophers to make this attempt, 1 and so it is especially 
appropriate that his views should now be set out in a book. 
I should say, at the outset, that I thoroughly approve of the Meinongian 
project. As Parsons makes clear (pp. 32-38) ,  we refer to non-existents in 
much the same way as we refer to other objects. It is therefore incumbent 
upon the philosopher to work out the principles by which our discourse con- 
cerning such objects is governed. Not that this is necessarily to endorse a 
realist position towards the objects of the resulting theory. Nominalists and 
Platonists alike may attempt to set out the principles-that govern arithmetical 
discourse; and it is in the same spirit that the realist or anti-realist may 
attempt to set out the principles of our fictional discourse. 
Despite my approval of the project, I must admit to some misgivings as 
to how Parsons has carried it out. These misgivings are of two kinds. There 
are first some internal criticisms, requiring only change within Parsons' basic 
approach. There are then some external criticisms, requiring change to the 
basic approach. 
These criticisms, though, should not be thought to detract from the merits 
of Parsons' book. It is, in many ways, an admirable contribution to the field. 
It gives weight both to the interest and the legitimacy of the Meinongian 
enterprise; it pinpoints the difficulties which any satisfactory theory must 
deal with; and in its solution to those difficulties, it sets up a theory with a 
degree of rigour and systematicity that should serve as a model for years to 
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come. As a well worked-out and accessible contribution to object theory, 
there is no better book. 
1. B A C K G R O U N D  
Before presenting Parsons' views, it will be worthwhile to place his approach 
to object theory in perspective. The theory of objects may be seen to have 
its origin in the following naive principle of abstraction: 
For any condition on properties, there is an object that has exact- 
ly those properties satisfying the condition. 
In the same way, the theory of properties or of sets might be seen to have 
its origin in the principle: 
For any condition on objects, there is a property (set) that has 
(or contains) just those objects satisfying the condition. 
There are those for whom this is an inauspicious start to any theory. What 
distinguishes properties from objects, they would say, is just that there are 
complex properties - the complement of red, the disjunction of red or green 
- but not, in the same way, complex objects - the 'complement' of Socrates, 
the 'disjunction' of Socrates and Plato. I would not, in the last analysis, wish 
to endorse anything quite like the naive abstraction principle for objects, 
but such philosophers would do well to reflect on the grounds for discrimi- 
nating between objects and properties in this way. There is a complete sym- 
metry in the two forms of abstraction principle. In the one case, the domain 
of objects is kept fixed and properties are introduced to enter into new con- 
figurations of relationship with those objects. In the other case, the domain 
of properties is kept fixed and objects are introduced to enter into new con- 
figurations of relationship with the properties. What grounds are there, then, 
for preferring the one kind of principle of abstraction or domain extension to 
the other? 
But even if the abstraction principles are allowed to stand, there will be 
problems with the naive approach. In the first place, both abstraction prin- 
ciples will be internally inconsistent. If the 'objects' are taken to include the 
properties, then property abstraction will lead to paradoxes of the sort 
described by Russell; and object abstraction will lead to similar paradoxes 
should the properties be taken to include the objects. Indeed, in this respect, 
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object abstraction has something of an edge over property abstraction; for 
whereas it is plausible to include the properties among the objects, it is not 
so plausible to include the objects among the properties. 
But even if the paradoxes could somehow be resolved, the two principles 
would still be inconsistent when taken together. Perhaps the simplest case 
of inconsistency arises from using property abstraction to obtain a property, 
such as being self-distinct, not had by any object, and then using object 
abstraction to obtain an object which has that property. 
The domain of objects and properties cannot be extended in the ways 
jointly prescribed by the naive principles of object and property abstraction. 
The naive theory must be modified. 
There are basically two ways in which this can be done, both suggested 
by Meinong's pupil, Mally. 2 The first depends upon introducing two copulas: 
one is an ordinary copula and may be called 'exemplification'; the other 
is a special copula, which we may follow Zalta [9] in calling 'encoding'. 
The principle of property abstraction will then be used to state the condi- 
tions under which an object exemplifies a property, the principle of object 
abstraction to state the conditions under which an object encodes a property. 
The obvious sources of conflict between the two principles will then be 
removed. The object that has the (or a) null property, for example, will 
encode that property but not exemplify it. 
The second method depends upon introducing two kinds of property: 
the ordinary or '_nuclear' properties, and the special or 'extra-nuclear' ones. 
The properties assumed to exist under property abstraction will be extra- 
nuc/ear, while the properties used to characterize objects under object abstrac- 
tion will be nuclear. The null property will then be extra-nuclear and so will 
not be had by any object. 
Very roughly, we may say that Castafieda [1 ], Rappaport [7] and Zalta 
[9] favour the dual copula approach, whilst Parsons and Routley [8] favour 
the dual property approach. It is rather hard to classify the theory considered 
in my [2], since its story-relative copula is not properly a copula at all. But 
formally, it is closest to the dual copula approach. 
As is only natural at this stage of enquiry, advocates of either approach 
have been concerned to develop their own particular theories. But now that 
those theories are at hand, what is badly needed is some sort of overview. One 
is reminded of the situation that prevailed in set theory prior to the advent of 
proof- and model-theoretic methods of comparison. One then had a plethora 
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of set theories, each with its own motivation and n o t a t i o n -  type theory, 
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, set]class theory, and so on. We now have a 
much better understanding of the connections among these different theories; 
and it is to be hoped that a similar understanding can be gained for the 
different object theories. 
On the face of it, the two approaches to the subject are very different, 
with the one postulating a fundamental ambiguity in the copula and the 
other a fundamental division within the category of properties. But there 
is a way in which the two approaches can be brought closer together. We may 
treat the encoder's assertion that x exemplifies P as tantamount to the nuclear 
theorist's assertion that x has P; and we may treat the encoder's assertion 
that x encodes P as tantamount to the nuclear theorist's assertion that x has 
the nuclear property pNassociated with P (of which more will be said later). 
Under the reasonable assumption that every nuclear relation is a nuclear 
weakening PN of some extra-nuclear relation P, this then leads to a two-way 
translation between the languages of the encoder and the nuclear-theorist. 
The difference between the two might be put in the following way. Each 
subject-predicate statement is first expressed in neutral fashion as (P, t, ~r), 
where rr indicates the status of the predication as 'ordinary' or 'special'. The 
encoder then thinks of the status-indicator as attaching to the copula in 
ordinary subject-predicate statements, while the nuclear theorist conceives of 
it as attaching to the predicate. 
Under such a translation, the theories on one approach will be interpretable 
as theories on the other approach. It is not to be expected that the actual 
theories developed on either approach will be mutually interpretable; the 
choice of the axioms is too random for that. But to any reasonable theory of 
the one sort, there will correspond a reasonable theory of the other sort. 
The translation might also be used to set up a correspondence between 
the problems that arise on either approach and the solutions that may be 
given to them. It will be recognized that the various problems are not peculiar 
to either approach, but will have their counterpart for the other. 
Of course, whenever one has the mutual interpretability of two theories, 
the question arises as to which, ff either, is more basic. Is talk of encoding 
merely an indirect way of referring to the nuclear weakening pN, or nuclear 
weakening an indirect way of referring to encoding? Or are both perhaps 
mere notational variants of some more basic language? 
I must admit, given that one is going to talk either language, to having 
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some preference for the encoder's way of putting things. Even if one grants 
that the ordinary copula is unambiguous, it seems almost irresistible to 
suppose that the way a non-existent has a nuclear property is different from 
the way an existent has that property or any object has an extra-nuclear 
property. The very word 'nuclear' suggests as much. It is as if the nuclear 
property were internal to its non-existent bearer, but external to its existent 
bearer - somehow constituting the non-existent, but not the existent. But if 
this is so, it would suggest that the ordinary copula is to be analysed into two 
relations of the sort favoured by the encoder, with the one serving to say how 
the object is defined and the other how it is characterised. 
2. T H E  T H E O R Y  
At the heart of Parsons' theory is a distinction and two principles. The distinc- 
tion is between nuclear and extra.nuclear properties. Ordinary properties - 
such as being a detective, being golden, being a mountain - are nuclear; the 
others are extra-nuclear (pp. 22-23).  The distinction may also be understood 
in terms of its role in the theory. Nuclear properties are used to formulate 
the principle of object abstraction, extra-nuclear properties the principle of 
property abstraction. Nuclear properties,we see, serve to define non-existents, 
extra-nuclear properties to qualify them. 
One of the two principles is a restricted version of Abstraction. It states: 
For any condition on nuclear properties, there is an object having 
exactly those nuclear properties satisfying the condition (pp. 19, 
73). 
Given that being golden and being a mountain are nuclear, it follows from 
this principle that there is an object whose sole nuclear properties are being 
golden and being a mountain. It also follows that there is an object, a 'com- 
plement' of Socrates, whose nuclear properties are exactly those not possessed 
by Socrates. 
The other principle is for the identity of objects. It states: 
Objects with the same nuclear properties are the same (pp. 19, 
74). 
It follows from this principle that there is at most one object whose nuclear 
properties are being golden and being a mountain or at most one object which 
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is the complement of Socrates. Thus from the two principles together, it 
follows that there is a unique object whose nuclear properties are being 
golden and being a mountain ('the golden mountain') and that there is a 
unique complement to Socrates. 
This is the core theory. It gets extended in two main w a y s -  first to 
nuclear weakenings, then to nuclear relations. For the first extension, Parsons 
supposes that for any extra-nuclear property or relation R, there is a nuclear 
weakening or watered-down version R N of R.3 The nuclear weakening will 
agree with the original relation on existents, i.e. 
For any existents xl ,  ~.., xn, R N of xl ...Xn i f fR  of xl ""Xn (p. 
73). 
The advantage of the nuclear weakening over its original is that it may be 
used to define new objects. But in order that there should be a reasonable 
stock of extra-nuclear relations and hence of weakenings, Parsons assumes a 
suitable form of relation abstraction: 
For any condition on objects, there is an extra-nuclear relation 
relating exactly those objects (in the right order) that satisfy 
the condition (p. 72). 
For example, from this principle there is an extra.nuclear property had by 
exactly those objects that are not round; and so by the weakening principle, 
there is a nuclear property had by those existents that are not round. 
Parsons later assumes that there is a specific extra-nuclear property Xx~o(x), 
the property of x's ~-ing, that conforms to property abstraction for the con- 
dition ~o(x) and (similarly for relations). So by weakening, there will be a 
specific nuclear property (Xxg(x))  N that is had by an existent just in case it 
~0s. 
Parsons spends a good deal of time on explaining the nuclear/extra-nuclear 
distinction, but comparatively little on the concept of nuclear weakening. 
This associated concept is perhaps best understood in terms of two notions of 
property abstraction. The property Xx~o(x) of being a ~0-er may be under- 
stood to conform to the unrestricted principle of property abstraction, or it 
may be understood to conform to property abstraction in its application to 
existents, but to be at the mercy of object abstraction in its application to 
non-existents. The one property may be denoted by Xx~o(x) and the other 
by XNx~o(x). The nuclear weakening (hxg(x))  N of Xx~o(x) may then be 
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taken to be )tNx~o(x). 4 This account conforms to what Parsons himself says, 
since he defines XXx~o(x) as (Xx~o(x)) N (p. 104), but not to his order of 
explanation. 
To develop the theory of nuclear relations, Parsons introduces the notion 
of plugging. He supposes that from any (n + l)-place nuclear (extra-nuclear) 
relation, n > 1, an n-place nuclear (extra-nuclear) relation can be obtained 
by plugging up one of its argument-places with an object (p. 65). Thus if 
the given relation is the 2-place nuclear relation R, then two nuclear proper- 
ties may be obtained by plugging, one the property [Rx] of bearing R to x 
and the other the property [xR] of being an object to which x bears the 
relation R. If, for example, R is the relation of kicking and x is Holmes, then 
[Rx] is the property of kicking Holmes, while [xR ] is the property of having 
Holmes kick one. 
The assumptions concerning the operation of plugging are for the most 
part straightforward. However, two are of particular interest. The first states 
that no existent has the nuclear property [Rx] of bearing a nuclear relation 
R to a non-existent x, and similarly for other plug-ups (pp. 75-76).  It is 
impossible by this assumption, for example, that Gladstone should have 
the property of kicking Holmes, though Watson may have that property. 
According to the second of the two assumptions (which is put forward as a 
definition), x bears the nuclear relation R to y if and only if x has the proper- 
ty [Ry] and y has the property [Rx], i.e. xRy=-x[Ry] ^ [xR]y (p. 66). It 
follows from this, for example, that Watson kicks Holmes iffWatson has the 
property of kicking Holmes and Holmes has the property that Watson kicks 
him. 
The analysis of relations is one of  the most distinctive features of  Parsons' 
theory; though, in some respects, it is reminiscent both of the early attempt 
to fit relational statements within the framework of Aristotehan logic and the 
more recent reduction by Sch6nfinkel of many-place to one-place functions. 
As the theory stands, it is unclear how it is to apply to non-existents as 
they are ordinarily given in stories, beliefs, dreams, and the like. To this end, 
Parsons introduces what I call the Link Hypothesis. Let us treat of stories 
as a typical case. Say that an object of a story is native if it is introduced or 
created in that story, and otherwise immigrant. For example, Rosencrantz 
is native to Shakespeare's Hamlet but not to the Tom Stoppard play. Then 
the Link Hypothesis states that: 
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An object native to a story has exactly those nuclear properties 
attributed to it in the story (pp. 54-55).  
Thus this hypothesis effects a bridge between the world of the story and the 
world of reality. 
Given the hypothesis ,we may apply the theory to those fictional characters 
that we ordinarily talk about. Rosencrantz, for example, will have various 
nuclear properties in Hamlet; and so he will be that object whose nuclear 
properties are those that are attributed to Rosencrantz in the play. 
The above theory is intended to solve broadly three main problems. The 
f'trst is to account, or allow, for the truth of many of our ordinary judgements 
concerning non-existents-  that Holmes is a detective, that Pegasus is a 
mythical horse, that Holmes is more famous than any real detective (of. p. 
32). A certain sub-class of these judgments is of particular importance. They 
include 'Holmes is a detective' and 'Hamlet is a prince' and are true, if true at 
all, because of what is said in the story or context in which the objects 
appear. Such judgements may be called literalist. 
The second problem is to explain what non-existents there are, to provide 
a reasonably rich ontology of such objects. The final problem is to explain 
what those objects are, to provide some method of individuation for them. 
The last two problems might be called, somewhat grandiosely, the problems 
of ontology and identity (cf. p. 52). 
The first of the problems will only arise for those who accept the truth 
of the judgements in question. On the other hand, the other two problems 
are likely to arise for anyone who takes our reference to non-existents serious- 
ly. 
We can see, in broad terms, how Parson's theory solves these problems. 
First, the Link Hypothesis will tell us why Hamlet is a prince or Holmes a 
detective. Second, Object Abstraction will tell us what objects there are, 
viz one for each class of nuclear properties. Finally, Object Identity will 
provide us with a method for individuating objects in terms of their nuclear 
properties. The other axioms of the theory do not directly figure in the solu- 
tions to these problems, but they may largely be thought to play an auxiliary 
role, providing us with a fund of nuclear properties to be used in the applica- 
tion of the more central axioms. 
Let us now present the internal criticisms. These stay within Parsons' 
basic approach to the extent that some form of the Link Hypothesis and of 
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the Identity and Abstraction axioms is preserved. I have not always stated the 
arguments in full or set out the suggestions for improvement with complete 
formal precision. But it should be dear, from what I say, both how the argu- 
ments may be developed and how the suggestions may be worked up into a 
rigorously stated theory. To a large extent, the details may be gathered from 
the related discussion of the contextualist theory in [2]. 
3. THE L I N K  
I shall argue that if Parsons' theory is to be successful in individuating the 
objects from stories or other contexts, then the form of the Link Hypothesis 
needs to be modified. 
There are two main problems. To appreciate the nature of the first, con- 
sider a story in which the nuclear properties directly attributed to two of its 
native characters are the same. The only apparent intra-story difference 
between them lies in their extra-nuclear properties: one is said to be admired, 
the other detested, one a better detective than Holmes, the other not, and so 
on. It would then appear that the two objects are distinct, since one has 
extra-nuclear properties in the story not possessed by the other. It would also 
appear that the objects have the same nuclear properties in the story. But it 
would then follow by the Link Hypothesis that they actually have the same 
nuclear properties and so, by the Identity Axiom, are the same. 
Parsons is well aware of this difficulty and tries to get round it by arguing 
that just as existents have the nuclear weakenings of their extra-nuclear 
properties, so existents of stories have, within those stories, the nuclear 
weakenings of their extra-nuclear properties (cf. p. 198). It follows that the 
native objects of a story can be distinguished by these nuclear weakenings, if 
not by the explicitly given nuclear properties. One of the characters of our 
example will have the nuclear weakening of being admired, the other the 
nuclear weakening of being detested, and so on. 
It may be conceded that normally such a move is justified. But what if 
the story is some kind of philosophical fantasy in which the rule of nuclear 
weakening is not assumed to have full reign? Perhaps it is an important part 
of the story that an object n e v e r  has the nuclear weakening of its extra- 
nuclear properties. There would then appear to be no basis for attributing 
to an object the nuclear weakenings of the extra-nuclear properties attributed 
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to it in the story; and so if two such objects differed in the story only in their 
extra-nuclear properties, they would be nuclearly indistinguishable. 
Such an example suggests what we may dub the nuclear form o f  the Link 
Hypothesis: 
A native object of a story has the nuclear weakening of an extra- 
nuclear property iff it has the extra-nuclear property in the story. 
As it stands, this form of the principle says nothing about the nuclear proper- 
ties of  the object in the case in which they are not nuclear weakening. But 
this difficulty may be met, though this is not the only way, by assuming that 
each nuclear property is the nuclear weakening of some extra-nuclear proper- 
ty. s 
With the adoption of the new form of the Link Hypothesis, the problem 
over the philosophical fantasy can be met; for even though the native objects 
may not have the nuclear weakenings of  their extra-nuclear properties in the 
story, they will still have them in fact. 
To appreciate the nature of the second difficulty, consider a story in 
which the only difference between two native characters a and b lies in the 
complex propositions attributed to them, those not directly of subject- 
predicate form. Perhaps it is true in the story that a is a cheat or is a liar 
(Ca u La), but not that b is a cheat or a liar (Cb V Lb); and similarly for 
other complex propositions. Then a and b would appear to have the same 
properties in the story and hence, by either the original or nuclear form of 
the Link Hypothesis, have the same nuclear properties. Yet they would also 
appear to be distinct, in contradistinction to the identity axiom. 
Presumably, in the face of such examples, Parsons would again resort to 
the strategy of 'going nuclear'. He would argue that since a exists in the 
story and is a cheat or a liar, then he has the nuclear property of being a cheat 
or liar ~gx(cx V Lx)) in the story, while b does not. 
Such a move can be seen to depend upon a double intra-story inference: 
one from 'a is a cheat or a is a liar' (Ca V La) to 'a has the extra-nuclear 
property of being a cheat or a liar' (hx(Cx V Lx)a), which is predicational 
in form; and the other from 'a has the extra-nuclear property of being a cheat 
or a liar' (Xx(Cx v Lx)a) to 'a has the nuclear property of being a cheat or a 
liar' (kNx(Cx V Lx)a), which is nuclear-predicational in form. As we have 
seen, the second of these intra-story inferences can be challenged. But so can 
the first. The story might be a philosophical fantasy in which it is shown that 
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there are no complex properties or none that conform to ),-abstraction. 
There would then be no basis for supposing that a had in the story the com- 
plex extra-nuclear property of being a cheat or a liar, let alone its nuclear 
weakening. 
To take care of such examples, it seems to me, we must take greater care 
over the sense in which an object can be said to have a property in a story. 
Parsons introduces the notion of plugging, but we need to distinguish two 
senses in which a property can be plugged up with an object. Given a proper- 
ty and an object, we may let the internally formed proposition be the result 
of plugging up the argument-place of the property with the object, and we 
may let the externally [ormed proposition be to the effect that the object 
has the property. Thus if the property is ~x(Cx V Lx) and the object is a, 
then the internally formed proposition is that Ca V La, while the externally 
formed proposition is that Xx (Cx v Lx)a. 6 We may now say that an object 
implicitly has a property in a story if the internally formed proposition is 
true in the story, and that it explicitly has the property in the story if the 
externally formed proposition is true in the story. 
Before we followed Parsons in taking the story-relative copula to have the 
explicit sense. We may now take it to have the implicit sense. Combining this 
change with the previous one then gives us the following form of the Link 
Hypothesis: 
A native object of  a story has the nuclear weakening of an extra- 
nuclear property iff it implicitly has the extra.nuclear property 
in the story. 
This form of the hypothesis might be called the Indirect Link, in contrast to 
the original direct link form of the hypothesis. 
We now see that our difficulties over the anti-platonic story are removed. 
For the object a will implicitly have the property P = 2tx(Cx v Lx) in the 
story, if not explicitly. It will therefore be distinguished from b by its posses. 
sion of the nuclear weakening pN of P. 
It is worth noting that the encoder theorist will face the second of these 
two difficulties, but not the first. His naive formulation of the Link Hypo- 
thesis is that a native object encodes just those properties it has in its story. 
The first difficulty will not arise for him since it depends upon the distinc- 
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tion between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties. However, the second dif- 
ficulty will require him, in much the same way as the nuclear theorist, to 
distinguish between the implicit and the explicit copula. 
Is there any way in which Parsons can avoid these modifications to the 
Link Hypothesis? It does not seem important to me that he should, though 
they do mar the simplicity of its original formulation. Perhaps the best he can 
say is that the nuclear properties that he needs really are available from the 
stories. Although the anti-nuclear story denies that its objects have the 
nuclear weakenings of their extra-nuclear properties, still it will be true in 
the story that they have those nuclear weakenings; and although the anti- 
platonic story denies that there are complex properties, still it will be true in 
the story that its objects have the complex properties. 
The trouble with this proposal is that it makes the stories inconsistent; 
and yet there seems to be a clear difference between these stories and those 
that boast of such inconsistencies. Also, although the proposal might gain us 
distinctions in some cases, it would lose us distinctions in others. Imagine a 
story in which the crucial difference between two of its native characters con- 
sisted in the fact that one had the nuclear weakenings of its extra-nuclear 
properties, while for the other it was left open. If the second automatically 
acquired the nuclear weakenings within the story, then the distinction be- 
tween the two objects would be lost. 
Parsons seems to assume that his theory is internalized to stories, not in 
the sense of being part of them, but in the sense that they are closed under 
rules that it sanctions (cf. p. 200). He accepts not just the inference from an 
existent having an extra-nuclear property to its having the nuclear weakening, 
but also the inference from an existent within a story having an extra-nuclear 
property to its having the weakening within the story, and similarly for the 
rule of X-abstraction. But we must be careful to distinguish between the 
external and internal validity of a theory. The rules of a theory of non- 
existents are not so strong that they can penetrate to the wildest of all our 
fancies and dreams. They have a purely external validity, and govern the be- 
haviour of the objects from outside of the contexts in which they appear, 
not from within. 
But even if we confine our attention to stories that lie within the genre 
of realistic fiction, it is still not clear to me that the rules of nuclear weaken- 
ing and X-abstraction should have internal validity. The validity of these rules 
is, after all, a matter of philosophical controversy. As Parsons himself admits 
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(p. 227), the existence of complex properties has often been doubted; and if 
the rule of nuclear weakening has been doubted less, it is only because it 
has not been considered more. Is it seriously to be supposed that these 
dubious pieces of  philosophy are to be imported into the interpretation of 
fiction? 
Yet conceding the internal validity of the rules, it is still possible to 
construct clear examples of realistic fiction that result in difficulties of the 
first kind (though, alas, not of the second). Consider a story with two native 
characters that not only fail to exist but fail to exist in the story (they are 
internal non-existents). Then might not the only difference between them in 
the story lie in their extra-nuclear properties? The usual technique of going 
nuclear would not help here. For given that the objects fail to exist in the 
story, we cannot reasonable infer that they have, in the story, the nuclear 
weakenings of their extra-nuclear properties. 
Parsons tries to take care of this sort of problem (pp. 200-202).  He 
suggests that there will be two main sources of information about the nuclear 
properties of such objects. There will be 'outside' information from the story 
itself. But also, the main story may place these objects within the context of 
a subsidiary story and so there will be 'inside' information about the objects 
from the subsidiary story itself. Given that it is part of the main story that 
the objects have certain nuclear properties in the subsidiary stories, they will 
have them in the main story and so have them in fact. The properties will 
pass from the subsidiary story, as it were, through to the main story, and out 
to the real world. From such information, suitably fleshed out non-existents 
of a story can then be distinguished. 
There are various ways, though, in which such reasoning can fail us. It is 
not necessary that the main story should place the internal non-existents 
within the context of anything like a story. But let us grant that it does. Still, 
the nuclear properties of the objects in the subsidiary story will not be ex. 
portable unless they are taken in the main story to be native to their story. 
Without this assumption, the nuclear properties of the objects will be locked 
into the subsidiary story, and they can be as richly and variously described 
as one likes within that story without being distinguishable by their nuclear 
properties. (We might also note that exportation depends upon the Link 
Hypothesis being appropriately internalized to the main story; but we may 
grant this as part of the realistic constraints.) But ignoring this difficulty, 
it may be that the non-existents are indistinguishable within the subsidiary 
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story, yet distinguishable through their extra-nuclear properties in the main 
story. Perhaps the difference between them lies in the roles they play in the 
lives of the main characters: one is admired, the other detested; one inspires 
noble deeds, the other no deeds at all. It would then be true in the main 
story that there was some nuclear property on which they differed, but there 
would be no specific nuclear property upon which they did differ. Or again, 
the difference between the two non-existents might lie in the fact that the 
one, unlike the other, was denied to have certain properties in the subsidiary 
story or said to have one property in the story if it has another. In all of these 
ways, and others too, there may fail to be a nuclear property that distinguishes 
the two internal non-existents, 
So we see that the objections to our examples cannot be sustained and 
that the direct form of the Link Hypothesis must be abandoned. 
But can we be sure that the Indirect Link is not also open to counter- 
example? It can, in fact, be shown that the Indirect Link is impervious to all 
criticism of the kind that we have been presenting. What must be shown is 
that objects distinguishable within their stories are distinguishable in terms of 
their nuclear properties. So suppose the objects x and y are distinguishable 
within their stories. This means that one, say x, will implicitly have in its 
story an extra-nuclear property P not had by the other in its story. By the 
Indirect Link, x will have the nuclear weakening pN of P. But granted that 
par is not the nuclear weakening QX of any other property Q, it follows that 
y does not have the nuclear property pN. So, ill case the Indirect Link Hypo- 
thesis is adopted, we shall actually have a proof that story distinguishable 
objects are nuclearly distinguishable. 
There are, however, certain peculiarities in the application of the Indirect 
Link which, though not damaging, are worth pointing out. First, it follows 
that not all objects are possible objects of thought, in the sense that there can 
be a story or other context to which they are native. For consider the object 
a whose sole nuclear property is the property XNx(x=x) of being self-iden- 
tical. Then a cannot be native to any context. For if it were, the proposition 
that a = a would be true in that context. So a would implicitly have the 
property Xx(x=a) of being identical to a in that context. And therefore it 
would also have the nuclear property XNx(x=a) of being identical to a. 
This result implies, however, no essential limitation on our powers of concep- 
tion. It  is merely a consequence of the fact that an object cannot implicitly 
have certain properties in a story without implicitly having others. But it may 
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still be true that each abstract content, as given by a cluster of properties or 
relations, can appropriately be realised in thought. 
Second, the satisfactory individuation of objects may depend both upon 
iterating the operation XNx of nuclear abstraction and upon supposing that 
the iterations produce new properties. A good example of this arises from 
consideration of the existent golden mountain. This object, call it e~, will 
be individuated in terms of the nuclear properties of being existent, golden 
and a mountain. (There may be other nuclear properties, but only the nuclear 
property of existence will concern us.) Let us use Eo for the extra-nuclear 
property of existence and E1 for the nuclear property XNxEox of existence. 
Consider now the existent1 golden mountain, e2, and let E~ be the nuclear 
property XxNE~x of existenc%. The question arises as to whether el = e2 
and E~ = E2. Now Eo 4: E~, since el, the existent golden mountain, exists1 
but does not existo. It then seems reasonable that el v~ e~, since one is charac- 
terised as existento and the other as existent1. But then the only way of distin- 
guishing between el and e2 is in terms of El and E2. It therefore follows that 
E~ 4:E2. Proceeding in this way, we see that all of the iterations Eo, El ,  
E2, ... and all of the corresponding objects eo, el,  e2, ... are distinct f r o m  
one another. 
Finally, the Indirect Link no longer gives us a direct basis for the attribu- 
tion of nuclear properties to non-existents. A proposition of the form Pa 
will rarely, if ever, be true because that same proposition is true in the story 
to which the object a is native. What the truth of Pa in the story most directly 
justifies is the proposition (XNxPx)a; and so it is only if the property XNxPx 
should turn out to be identical to P, that the proposition Pa will also be 
justified. 
This is in striking contrast to the Direct Link. For there what justifies Pa 
is always the truth of that very same proposition in the story. However, as 
far as I can see, this feature does not impair the ability of the Indirect Link 
to explain the truth of  literalist judgements, such as "Holmes is a detective' 
or 'Hamlet is a prince'. For suppose that being a detective is the complex 
nuclear property XNx~o(x). Then it will be true in the Conan Doyle stories 
not just that XNx~(x) of a, but also that ~0(a); and so, by the Indirect Link, 
Holmes will have the nuclear property XNx~(x). The Direct and Indirect 
Links will predict slightly different literalist truths for certain special stories; 
but on these, our intuitions will not, in any case, be clear. 
It should be noted, though, that the original form of the Link Hypothesis 
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can be retained as long as our sole concern is to explain the truth of literalist 
judgements. The modifications to the hypothesis only arose from the further 
demand that objects be individuable in terms of their nuclear properties. 
4, C O R R E L A T E S  
Two objects are said to be correlates if the nuclear properties of either one 
involve the other. For example, the Watson and Holmes of Conan Doyle's 
stories are correlates, since Watson will have the nuclear property of living 
with Holmes and Holmes the nuclear property of living with Watson. 
Stories and other contexts naturally give rise to correlates. For suppose 
some proposition ~(a, b) involving the native objects a and b is true in a story. 
Then by the Indirect Link Hypothesis, a will have the property XNx~o(x, b) 
and b will have the property hNy~(a,y); and so a and b will be correlates. 
The Direct Link will also readily give rise to correlates. If, for example, the 
proposition that aRb is true in the story, then, by Parsons' theory of relations 
or realistic intra-story inference, a will have [Rb] and b JAR]. 
The presence of correlates gives rise to difficulties, both for the problem 
of ontology and for the problem of identity. In fact, the difficulties over 
correlates are an extreme case of a more general difficulty, that arises when- 
ever the individuation of non-existents leads in a circle, i.e. whenever the 
non-existents involved in the nuclear properties of one non-existent lead - 
through the non-existents involved in their nuclear properties, and so o n -  
back to the original object. 
In the case of the problem of ontology, the difficulty is that the theory of 
objects, as set out by Parsons, is incapable of proving the 'existence' of 
correlates. It is impossible to prove, for example, that there is a nuclear 
relation R and objects x and y such that [Ry] is the sole nuclear property 
to be possessed by x and [xR] is the sole nuclear property to be possessed 
by y;7 and this example is but one out of many. 
Parsons (pp. 194-197) is aware of this difficulty; but his response is 
curious. He seems to suggest that such principles should be obtained by com- 
bining the theory "with its application to fictional objects". Presumably 
what he has in mind is that we find in fiction the native objects with the 
correlative nuclear properties and then use the Link Hypothesis to establish 
that there are objects with those properties. But by the same token, one 
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might as well dispense with the abstraction axiom for objects and let the 
application of the theory determine that there are the objects that would 
otherwise be determined with its help. Surely we want the theory to explain 
how there can be the objects required by fiction, not to presuppose that there 
are such objects. The theory should anticipate what objects are to be found in 
fiction, not help itself to them. 
If the difficulty over correlates is to be met, then the axioms of the theory 
must be supplemented. But how? One possibility, considered but not endorsed 
by Parsons (pp. 196-197), is that the axioms for the identity of properties 
are to blame. We may suppose that all nuclear properties [Rx] or [xR], 
for all non-existent x, are the same. There is then no problem in proving 
the existence of correlates, since a single property P could be used in place 
of their correlative properties. 
But surely the assumption underlying this proposal is false. The property 
of living with Holmes just is not the same as the property of  living with 
Hamlet; the Conan Doyle stories ascribe the one to Watson, but not the other 
(cf. p. 197). But even if we take a more formalistic approach to property 
theory and only individuate properties to the extent that they are required 
to individuate objects, difficulties will remain. One counter-example is con- 
sidered by Parsons on pp. 196-197. Another, especially troublesome, case is 
that of two stories that differ only in the substitution of one immigrant 
character for another. If the two immigrant characters are sufficiently alike 
at source, then the native characters of either story would appear to be the 
same. 
We may further note that the proposal requires not just the identification 
of all relational properties of the form [Rx] and [xR], for x non-existent, 
but also the identification of all nuclear properties involving non-existents. 
But this is not something that can consistently be maintained with the rest 
of the theory. To take an artificial example, kNx(x = al A b = b) must be 
distinct from ~Nx(x =a2 A b =b),  for al and a2 distinct existents and b 
a nonexistent, since a~ has the one property but not the other. 
It must be accepted that the correct solution to this problem is the most 
obvious one: the abstraction axiom for objects must somehow be supple- 
mented. But how should the new formulation go? Once the great variety of 
correlative objects, as abstractly considered, is taken in, it will be appreciated 
that there is no simple way to 'fix' the axiom. Let me merely state how I 
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think the new formulation should go without attempting to retrace the steps 
by which it was reached. These steps may to some extent be recovered from 
the discussion of the related problem in Section D4 of [2]. 
Call a proposition nuclear ff it is of the form Ral ... an for R a nuclear 
relation or property. Let the nuclear content of the objects al, ..., an consist 
of all the nuclear propositions in which at least one of a, ,  , . , %  figures as a 
subject. (In the more general case, we would allow for infinitely many objects 
here and even for infmitary relations.) Call an n-ary extra-nuclear relation R 
quasi-nuclear ff the implicity formed proposition resulting from plugging the 
n objects a, ,  2.., an into R is always a nuclear proposition involving at least 
one of a, , i.., an as subjects. The relations Xxy(x [Ry ] ) and Xxy(X~V z~o(z, x)y), 
for example, are quasi-nuclear. Now say that a class C of quasi-nuclear n.ary 
relations is the abstract nuclear content of the objects al ,  ".,an if (i) all 
of al, ".,an are distinct, (ii) no relation of C involves any of a,, ...,an, and 
(iii) the nuclear content of al,. . . ,  an is obtained by plugging the objects 
al, i..,an into the relations of C. 
Then the revised and expanded version of object abstraction becomes: 
Any class C of n-ary quasi-nuclear relations is the abstract nuclear 
content of some objects a, ,  ..., an. 
As it stands, this axiom is not quite right. For letting C---{Xx~ X2 Px~ ,  
?txl x2Px2 }, it follows that there are two distinct objects whose sole nuclear 
property is P, in contradistinction to the identity axiom. To rule out such 
cases, we must require that there not be any symmetry among the argument- 
places of C (a notion that may be made precise in terms of the relations 
induced through a permutation in the argument-places). Such a restriction 
is awkward and somewhat mars the simplicity of the scheme, but it has a 
rather satisfactory consequence in case C is empty. It will then follow that 
n = I; for otherwise there would be a degenerate symmetry among the 
argument-places of the content. Thus there will be a null object, but no 
'null correlates'. 
The revised axiom also does not explicitly allow for the possibility that 
existents may be subjects of nuclear propositions involving non-existents. 
This is all to the good ff one does not believe in such a possibility. But other- 
wise it is necessary to further complicate the formulation of the axiom. 
We can think of the revised version of abstraction in the following way. 
Given any distinct objects al ..... an, we can form their nuclear content; 
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and from this, by abstraction from their occurrence in the nuclear proposi- 
tions, we can form their abstract nuclear content. The new axiom then says 
that, conversely, any appropriate class of relations can be obtained as the 
abstract nuclear content of some objects. 
To see how the axiom works in a particular case, consider characters 
Watson and Holmes from an artificially thin story, whose nuclear content 
consists of the propositions that Watson is a medical doctor, that Holmes is 
a detective, and that Watson kicked Holmes (w w and w 
(Nothing turns on the artificiality of the example.) Let C consist of the follow- 
ing quasi-nuclear relations: kxl x2 Mxl, ~xl x2 Dx2 and kxl x2 (X1 [Kx2]). 
Then the new axiom gives us distinct objects al and a2 for which { w 
w w [Ka2 ] } is their nuclear content. Or again, the axiom will give us 
distinct objects, call them the Small and the Large, such that the sole nuclear 
proposition true of them is that the Small is smaller than the Large. (This 
may help with Plato's theory of forms.) 
As the new axiom hasbeen stated, it is not formulable within the resources 
of Parsons' theory. This can be done by introducing a new primitive, with the 
sense that an object 'occurs' or is 'involved' in a proposition. 8 But in that 
case, the plugging operator would need to be given the internalist interpreta- 
tion and further axioms concerning the identity of intensional entities would 
need to be added to the system for any reasonable deductive development. 
To some extent, a generalized form of abstraction can be stated without 
using the notion of involvement or presupposing a structural conception of 
relations or propositions. But such a formulation, in so far as it was adequate, 
would be very complicated; and so I shall not go into details. 
Let us now turn to the difficulties correlates raise for the problem of 
identity. Consider again an artificially thin story, one in which the sole 
proposition is that Watson kicked Holmes. It then seems reasonable that 
there should not be another story which differed from the original story 
only in its native objects. If the content of that story was provided by the 
proposition that Watson' kicked Holmes', then Watson' should be identical 
to Watson and Holmes' to Holmes. Call two objects a and b strict R-correlates 
if they are distinct and if the sole nuclear property of a is [Rb ] and the sole 
nuclear property of b is JAR]. Then what one requires is that if the pair 
(Holmes, Watson) are strict K-correlates, for K the relation of kicking, then 
there should not be any other pair of objects that are also strict K-correlates. 
More generally, what is required is that if a sequence of objects is correlated 
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through their nuclear properties or relations in a certain way, then there 
should not be any other sequence of objects that is so correlated. 
What makes this requirement so reasonable is the demand that the theory 
be capable of individuating non-existent objects in a non-circular way. If two 
pairs of objects (a, b) and (c, d) could both be strict R-correlates, we would 
have no way of identifying both members of a pair without already pre- 
supposing the identity of one of them. We could say what a was given b, 
and what b was given a, but not what a and b were independently of either. 
On the other hand, if (a, b) were the only pair of objects to be strict R- 
correlates, then they could simultaneously be identified, without circularity, 
as the unique pair of objects (x,y) for which [Ry] was the sole nuclear 
property o f x  and [Rx] the sole nuclear property o fy .  
Even if the demand for non-circular identification were given up, the 
uniqueness assumptions are required to avoid embarrassing metaphysical 
questions. If there can be distinct pairs of correlates, then how many of them 
can there be? If the Link Hypothesis leads to two native objects of a story 
being correlates, how do we tell, if there are several such paks of correlates, 
which particular pair they are? These questions seem to be 'metaphysical' 
in the bad sense of the term; they have no answer only because they should 
not have arisen. 
Parsons does not explicitly discuss non-circular individuation, but there is 
textual evidence that he wants it. On p. 185, he writes: "On the theory given 
here, if a piece of fiction accidentally turned out to be a complete and com- 
pletely accurate account of the entire (past, present and future) history of the 
universe, then all characters created therein would be identical with real 
objects." And on p. 188 he writes: "It is a consequence of my views that if 
two authors were to write exactly the same story, they would thereby have 
created the same characters." But neither thesis is a consequence of his 
theory as it stands. If, for example, the characters of the two stories were 
already different, then an application of Object Identity would not force 
them to be the same, since their correlative nuclear properties would also be 
distinct." The endorsement of either thesis would appear to arise from a 
commitment to non-circular individuation. 
The rationale for the identity axiom, though not its content, would also 
seem to involve such a commitment. At various places throughout the book, 
Parsons is concerned to defend the identity axiom against counter-examples. 
Now none of the counter-examples is a logical fantasy in which distinct 
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objects are said to be the same or in which native objects are not said to be 
identical to themselves. So why did he not, instead of constructing the 
elaborate defences that he does, simply identify each native object a in terms 
of the nuclear property of being identical to a? Surely the answer is that he 
is concerned to provide, not any distinguishing nuclear property, but one that 
distinguishes the object without circularity. 
In this connection, the discussion on p. 200 is especially revealing. He is 
there concerned to distinguish between an existent and imaginary policeman 
within a story. He suggests that the existent policeman has the nuclear 
property of being distinct from the imaginary policeman, while the imaginary 
policeman does not. But why did he not use the simpler nuclear property 
of being identical to the existent policeman? Presumably, his thought is that 
the imaginary policeman can be identified independently of the existent 
policeman and that in this way, unlike the other, the existent policeman can 
then be identified without circularity in terms of the nonexistent policeman. 
It seems, then, both in regard to what is reasonable and what Parsons 
wants to say, that the theory should provide for the non-circular individua- 
tion of non-existents. But the theory, as it stands, is incapable of doing this. 
It is incapable, for example, of proving that paks of strict R-correlates are 
the same .9 
As before, it is possible to locate the fault in the axioms for the identity of 
properties; but there are again the same objections to this proposal. It seems 
better to extend the identity axiom for objects. Taking into account the 
whole gamut of correlative objects, what we need to say is that the abstract 
nuclear content of any n distinct objects uniquely determines those objects. 
That is: 
If two n-tples X1, . . . ,X n and Yl, " " ' Y n  have the same abstract 
nuclear content, then the n-tples are the same, i.e. xa = Ya .... , 
Xn  = y n . 
The new axioms of abstraction and identity effect a fundamental shift in the 
perspective on the objects of the theory. For Parsons, objects are determined 
singly, in terms of their nuclear properties. For us they are determined simul- 
taneously in terms of their nuclear properties and relations. One can, if one 
likes, think of nuclear predications as containing variables for "unknown 
objects". Then for Parsons, one can uniquely solve for any suitable class of 
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equations in a single unknown; while for us, one can uniquely solve for any 
number of unknowns. 
The more limited perspective of Parsons may arise from a false analogy 
with the theory of properties or relations. Properties and relations are singly 
determined by the appropriate forms of abstraction; andtherefore it is 
supposed that the objects must also be singly determined. But a better 
understanding of the analogy between the two types of abstraction leads 
to a different view. In the objectual analogue of an abstraction axiom, the 
role of subject and predicate is reversed. Thus corresponding to the principle 
that every condition on objects determines a property ( 3 P V x(Px =- ~o(x))) 
is the principle that every condition on properties determines an object 
(3x  V P(Px =-~o(e))). If now we start with the relational form of abstrac- 
tion, that every condition on pairs of objects determines a relation ( 3 R  V 
x Vy(Rxy =-~p(x,y))), the reversal of roles gives us the principle that every 
condition on relations de te rmines -no t  an object, since that makes no 
sense - but a pair of objects. The multiplicity of subject terms in a relational 
statement forces upon us the simultaneous determination of the objects 
in the corresponding axiom of abstraction. 
The new perspective, once adopted, brings several advantages in its train. 
It fits in well, first of all, with a generative or constructive conception. 
According to such a conception, the objects, properties and relations are 
generated in a definite order, much as are the sets of the cumulative hierarchy. 
Thus properties and relations help to generate objects; these objects help to 
generate new properties and relations; and so on. 
Now as Parsons himself points out (pp. 195-196), it is difficult for him 
to maintain such a generative conception. For on his view, objects must be 
generated from properties. So Holmes must be generated with the help of the 
property of living with Watson, which must be generated with the help of 
Watson. But in the same way, Watson must be generated with the help of 
Holmes; and so we are left with a circle. 
On our view, the difficulty disappears. Objects will be generated simul- 
taneously from abstract nuclear contents. We might, in reductive fashion, 
think of them as ordered pairs, consisting of a nuclear content and an index 
to indicate which argument-place the object is to fill. Thus the native characters 
of the Conan Doyle stories will emerge together from the appropriate abstract 
nuclear content. In such a way, the circle that arises from correlates will be 
avoided. 
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Another advantage of the enlarged conception of objects is that it avoids 
the complications in Parsons' theory of relations. Parsons' theory is motivated 
by two main concerns. The first, and more important, is to give some account 
of when relational statements between non-existents hold (cf. p. 67). The 
theory does give some account of when subject.predicate statements Pa hold, 
for it will be part of the "identity' or 'def'mition' of the non-existent a that it 
should have the property P; but it fats to give a similar account of when 
relational statements Rab hold. The second, and less important, concern is to 
uphold the intuition, deriving from Bolzano, that no existent enter into a 
nuclear relation with a non-existent. 
Parsons solves the first of these problems with his stipulation that the 
relational statement Rab should be defined by the conjunction of a[Rb] 
and [aR] b. The truth of the relational statement will then be reduced to the 
attribution of nuclear properties, which will flow from the definitions of the 
objects in the normal way. The second of the problems is solved through 
his assumption that no existent have a relational property [Rx] or [xR] 
involving the non-existent x. 
But there is, in this theory, a significant ambiguity. For as in the case of 
properties, the notion of plugging for relations may be given either an in- 
ternal or an external sense. If R is the relation ~,Nxyr then the ex- 
ternal plugging of a in the first argument-place will be ~tlvy aRy(= ;~Ny 
([~Nxy~p(x,y)]ay)), while the internal plugging up will be ~.Nytp(a,y). Even 
though he has the notation for nuclear abstraction, Parsons nowhere says 
whether plugging is to be taken in the internal or external sense or in some 
other sense altogether. 
If plugging is taken in the external sense, then a significant simplification 
can be effected in his theory. Relational statements may be reinstated as part 
of the primitive notation of the theory and plugs, such as [xR], may be 
dropped as primitive and be defined instead in terms of abstracts, such as 
~Ny (xRy). In this way, the complicated axioms for plugs may be derived 
from the usual axioms for h-abstraction; and we shall be left with Parsons' 
definition of relational statements as an axiom: 
(,) xRy--- [xR]y ^ y[Rx], 
along with the axiom forbidding intercourse of the existent with the non- 
existent. 
Parsons himself briefly considers a similar proposal, but rejects it on the 
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grounds that there is then no adequate account of the relational statement 
xRy (fn. 3, p. 67). But here there is an error. Given a relation R, we can 
understand the identity of XNyxRy or XNxxRy apart from their application 
conditions as well as we can understand the identity of  [xR] or [Ry]. (This 
is particularly clear on a structural conception of properties, since then their 
identity is given by their relevant structure and is completely independent 
of  their conditions of application.) Now to define the objects we do not need 
the application conditions of the properties. So the properties x~ry (xRy) and 
kNx(xRy) may be used to help define new objects and the axiom (*) then 
used to determine the application conditions of R. In other words, we may 
make a route from the identity of R, to the identity of XNy (xRy) and 
XNx(xRy), through to the identity of objects with those properties, and so 
to the application conditions of R. The mystery of relational statements is 
solved as well as it is on Parsons' account. 
However, the whole idea that there is a special problem about relational 
statements is not one that should arise. It only arises for Parsons because of 
his unduly narrow conception of how objects are defined. Since they are 
only given in terms of their nuclear properties, the basis for relational attribu- 
tions does indeed appear problematic. But take objects to be simultaneously 
defined in terms of their nuclear properties and relations, and the problem 
disappears. The nuclear relations into which an object enters will be given in 
the same direct way as the nuclear properties which it possesses. It will be 
as much a part of the definition of Holmes and Watson that the one lives with 
the other as that one is a detective and the other a doctor. 
But although the problem that motivated ( , )  as a definition disappears, 
the question of the truth of (*) as a thesis remains. Now on the external inter- 
pretation of plugging, the thesis is not at all plausible; and so although the 
formulation of the axioms can be simplified under this interpretation, it is 
not a simplification that I would recommend. On the other hand, under the 
internal interpretation of plugging - and this came as a great surprise to me 
- it may plausibly be argued that the thesis is true, at least in its application 
to those objects that are real or are native to a story or other context. 
For take R to be of the form XNxy~o(x,y). Suppose that aRb. If a and b 
both exist, then it is clear that a[Rb] and [aR] b. Given that existents do not 
enter into nuclear relations with non-existents, the only other case is that a 
and b are both nonexistent. Now it is plausible to extend one direction of 
the Link Hypothesis to relations in the following way: 
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If  x is native to a story s, then xRy only if x and y implicitly 
have R in the story s. 
Since a is non-existent, it is native to some story s, say. By the above condi- 
tional, a and b implicitly l~ave R in s. So the proposition that ~(a, b) is true in 
s. So a implicitly has ?~x~o(x, b) in s. But [Rb] is klVx~(x, b) and therefore, 
by the non-relational form of the lank Hypothesis, a[Rb]. In the same way, 
it may be shown that [aR]b. Now suppose [aR]b A a[Rb]. I f a  and b both 
exist, it is clear that aRb. Granted that existents cannot have nuclear proper- 
ties [xR] or [Rx], for x non-existent, the only other case is that a and b 
are both non-existent. The objects a and b are then native to respective stories 
s and t, let us say. By the usual form of the Link Hypothesis, the proposition 
that r b) is true in both s and t. Suppose that s and t are distinct. Then 
given that an object is native to at most one story, it follows that there are 
two stories s and t, with a native to s but immigrant to t and b native to t 
but immigrant to s. But this situation may be ruled out as ill-founded. So we 
may assume that s and t are identical. Extending the other direction of the 
Link Hypothesis to relations, we have: 
The objects x and y bear R if they are native to the same story 
and implicitly bear the relation R in that story. 
Since a and b are native to the same story and implicitly have R = )~xyr y) 
in that story, it follows that aRb. 
The above derivation depends upon certain assumptions, but they are all 
faily plausible. We may also note that, conversely, the relational form of the 
Link Hypothesis may be derived as long as (*) is adopted as an assumption. 
So we see that although the original motivation for the thesis - the elimina- 
tion of relational statements - was misconceived, it may still be retained for 
the related purpose of  eliminating the relational applications of the Link 
Hypothesis. 
5. T H E  P A R A D O X E S  
Since object theory adopts an abstraction principle for objects, it is not 
surprising that it falls foul of Russell-type paradoxes. There are basically 
two kinds of paradox that can arise, one deriving from the lack of restriction 
on properties, and the other from the lack of restriction on objects. I shall 
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here discuss how these paradoxes arise and how they are to be resolved in 
the context of Parsons' theory. Similar paradoxes have been discussed else- 
where; and the reader may consult [2], D2-3 ,  for a fuller account and 
further references. 
To see how the first paradox arises, consider again the principle of proper- 
ty abstraction: 
For any condition there is a property that an object has iff it 
satisfies the condition. 
From this principle, it follows that: 
( t )  There is no way of correlating each property with an object (with 
distinct properties correlated to distinct objects). 
The proof is straightforward, but we can see intuitively why the consequence 
should hold through considerations of cardinality. For if there were the 
proposed correlation, there would be at least as many objects as properties; 
but by property abstraction, it follows that there must be more properties 
than objects. 
Now in an object theory, some form of object abstraction is likely to be in 
conflict with (t) .  In Parsons' theory, the conflict arises in the following way. 
For any property P, there will be a nuclear weakening P. With each such 
nuclear weakening may be associated an object x for which P is the sole 
nuclear property. But given what we may call the Distinctness Thesis: 
Nuclear weakenings of distinct extra-nuclear properties are 
distinct (P r Q implies P --/: Q), 
the above procedure then correlates each property P with a distinct object x. 
Parsons' solution to this paradox is, in effect, to drop the Distinctness 
Thesis fin. 14, pp. 203-204).  But this will not do. Fkst, there is the danger 
that the theory will not properly be able to distinguish distinct objects. 
Suppose P and Q are distinct extra-nuclear properties for which P = Q. 
Perhaps the only difference between two objects is that to one is attributed 
P in its native story, while to the other is attributed Q. There would then be 
no basis for distinguishing between them in terms of their nuclear properties. 
Parsons mentions this difficulty, but suggests that the thesis "could probably 
be maintained for typical cases of extra-nuclear predications in stories" 
(pp. 203-204).  But the difficulty needs to be met not just for the typical 
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but for the hypothetical cases as well; and it may then be plausibly argued 
that there is no reasonable class of properties for which the thesis holds. For 
suppose there were such a class. Then one would like it to contain the proper- 
ty of being an object that lacks any property P of the class for which P is 
its sole nuclear property. But this is enough to regenerate the paradox. 
A more serious objection to dropping the thesis is that it leaves us with no 
definite conception of what nuclear weakening is. With the thesis, we can 
think of the identity of the nuclear weakenings as being parallel to or even 
derivative from the identity of their extra-nuclear counterparts. If, on a 
structural conception of  properties for example, P is the property Xx~0(x), 
then we can conceive of the weakening P = XNx~(x) as being just like P, 
but with the nuclear operation of abstraction in place of the extra-nuclear 
operation. Without the thesis, however, we are left completely in the dark 
as to the identity of nuclear weakenings; and nor does there seem to be any 
sensible and non-circular account of what it might be. 
My own favoured solution to the paradox is to drop the principle of 
property abstraction. There still will be, for any condition r the property 
?txr of being a ~-er; but this property, in line with the condition ~(x), 
may be neither true nor false of certain objects and so may fail to conform 
to the bivalent interpretation of the abstraction principle. The details of such 
a proposal comprise a large and difficult question. But we may note that 
some such proposal is probably required, in any case, to deal with the classical 
paradoxes; and so the present solution may be seen, not as an ad hoc sugges- 
tion, but as part of a more general strategy for dealing with the paradoxes. 
The second paradox in object theory arises from the principle of object 
abstraction. In Parsons' theory, this principle takes the form: 
For any condition ~ on nuclear properties, there is an object that 
has a nuclear property iff it satisfies the condition. 
From this principle, it follows that: 
There is no way of correlating each object with a distinct nuclear 
property. 
Again, we can see intuitively why this consequence should hold; for if there 
were the correlation, there would be at least as many nuclear properties as 
objects, whereas, by the abstraction principle, there must be more objects 
than properties. 
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Now the principles concerning the identity of properties are likely to run 
into conflict with this consequence. For take any nuclear relation R, the 
nuclear relation of identity, say. It seems natural to assume that [Rx] and 
[Ry] are distinct for distinct x and y. But then the association of x with 
[Rx] gives the desired correlation of objects with nuclear properties (p. 235). 
It  is to be noted that a similar difficulty arises when any term of the form 
XSy~0(x,y) is used in place of [Rx]; and so the problem is not one that 
concerns the notion of plugging alone. In case r y) is the formula 'x = y ' ,  
an independent argument may be used to establish the distinctness claim. For 
the nuclear properties ky(x = y) must be different for different x, since only 
x has Xy(x=y). But then granted then Distinctness Thesis, the nuclear 
properties XJVy (x = y) will be different for different y. 
Parsons considers two solutions to this paradox. The first is to give up the 
principle that x ~ y D [Rx] ~ [Ry]. But is it not possible to believe of an 
object that it has [Rx], but not believe that it has [Ry]? Only, suggests 
Parsons, when x and y are conceivable objects, ones that can be had in mind. 
So the above principle need not be retained in its full generality, but only 
in its application to the conceivable objects (p. 236). 
However, this solution will not do. As in the case of the first paradox, 
there would appear to be no reasonable class of objects for which the dis- 
puted principle held. To mimic the previous argumentation, suppose that 
x C y entailed [Rx] 4: [Ry] for all conceivable x and y. Consider now the 
object x whose nuclear properties are just those P for which there is a con- 
ceivable y with P = [Ry] and ~Py. Presumably, x itself is a conceivable 
object. But then the paradox returns in full force. 1~ 
There is, however, a more serious objection to giving up the assumption 
that x 4= y implies [Rx] --/= [Ry] ; for as with the Distinctness Thesis, we are 
then left with no definite or reasonable conception of what the properties 
[Rx] are like. If [Rx] and [Ry] can sometimes be the same, for distinct 
x and y,  and sometimes distinct, how is it to be decided which? Indeed, the 
problem is even worse than this question might suggest; for if paradox is to 
be avoided, it is not only required that [Rx] and [Ry] be the same for some 
distinct x and y,  but also that some such x and y differ in whether they 
possess the property [Rx]. But if R is nuclear identity, let us say, how is it 
to be decided, given that [Rx] and [Ry] are the same, whether it is x or y 
that is to have the property? There seems to be no definite or reasonable 
way of resolving such questions. 
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Parsons' other proposal is to amend the abstraction axiom for objects. He 
suggests that a condition on properties only be taken to determine an object 
when its object quantifiers are restricted to existents. This proposal is some- 
what reminiscent of Russell's ramified theory, with the existents being of 
order 0 and the non-existents of order 1. 
Now certainly the system, as thus amended, is consistent (thereby answer- 
ing the first of the problems on p. 240). But it is unclear, first of all, what 
general conception of objects underlies the amended system. It is not strict 
ramification in the sense of Russell, since the relations used to define the 
objects in the revised axiom may themselves be defined in terms of unrestricted 
quantification over objects. Indeed, it is a kind of freak that the amended 
system is consistent at all. Suppose extra-nuclear predicates of  nuclear proper- 
ties were introduced into the system, with an appropriate form of abstrac- 
tion. Then inconsistency would be restored. 
But even if this difficulty is put aside, it is still not clear that the revised 
system is adequate for its intended applications. If it is only required that 
non-existents with finitely many nuclear properties be defined, there is no 
need for either restricted or unrestricted quantifiers; for object abstraction 
can simply take the form: 
VP1 .'..VPn ]xVP(Px=-PI X V ... V Pnx). 
But there seems to be something arbitrary about restricting the principle in 
this way; and, in any case, the existence of stories closed under a reasonable 
amount of inference would sometimes seem to require that their objects have 
infinitely many nuclear properties. In such cases, it is hard to see how to 
dispense altogether with the use of unrestricted object quantifiers in the 
formulation of the appropriate condition on the properties. We may wish to 
say, for example, that an object has all of the nuclear weakenings of the 
extra-nuclear properties implied in some sense by the extra-nuclear properties 
P attributed to it in its story. The question then arises as to how the relevant 
notion of implication is to be defined. One natural definition is that it be 
necessary, for all objects x, that if P of x, for every property P in the given 
class, then Q of x. But an existentially restricted quantifier could hardly be 
used in place of the unrestricted quantifier; since then the class of consequent 
properties Q would be too large. And nor it is clear in what other way the 
unrestricted quantifier could be dispensed with. 
One perhaps detects, in these proposed solutions to the paradox, an overly 
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formalistic attitude towards the task of constructing an adequate theory of 
objects. As in the early days of set theory, it is as if it were sufficient to 
construct a system that was strong enough to yield all theorems required for 
the application, but not so strong as to be inconsistent. Yet it should go with- 
out saying that we are after, not merely a formal solution to the paradoxes, 
but also a reasonable conception of what it is that we might have been talking 
about in the first place. I~ 
My own favoured solution to the paradox is to amend the abstraction 
axiom for objects, though not in the way required by Parsons. I wish to say, 
instead, that every set  of nuclear properties determines an object, but not 
necessarily every condition or class (and similarly for the relational forms of 
abstraction). The consequence of the paradoxical argument will now be that 
not every condition on nuclear properties determines a set of those proper- 
ties - which is what one would already expect. 
Such a view fits in well with the cumulative conception of objects. We can 
think of  the objects, properties and relations as being generated in succession, 
with the nuclear properties and relations at any one stage being used to define 
new objects, and with the objects at any one stage being used to determine 
new properties and relations, not as members of their extension but as con- 
stituents in their defining condition. At no stage of the constructive process 
will anything more than a set of properties, relations or objects be generated. 
So it is only sets of  properties or relations that will define objects and only 
sets of objects that will figure in properties. 
Although this view is so natural, it is not one that Parsons considers. 12 
There are perhaps various reasons for this. One is that the view is not readily 
formulated within the symbolism of his system. (There may be a lesson to 
be learned here on the dangers of premature formalisation.) Another reason is 
that Parsons may already have felt obliged to abandon the cumulative concep- 
tion of objects in the light of  the difficulties over correlates. Thus an in- 
adequate view on one problem may have lead to an inadequate solution of 
another. 
6. E S S E N T I A L I S M  
Parsons briefly discusses the extension of his theory to a modal language (pp. 
9 8 - 1 0 3 , 1 8 6 - 1 8 7 , 2 2 4 - 2 2 6 ) ,  and I here wish to take him up on two of the 
issues that he raises. I should emphasize, though, that I am more concerned 
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with how well different modal claims fit in with his general conception of 
objects than with the absolute truth of those claims. 
The first question concerns the rigidity of nuclear attributions to non- 
existents. Does a non-existent necessarily have tile same nuclear properties 
when it does not exist (V x VP((-Ex ^ Px) D ff](-Ex D Px))? 13 One might 
call this an essentialist question; though it is not one of the usual sort since, 
in it, non-existence plays the role that is usually played by existence. 
The rigidity assumption is very natural on Parsons' conception of objects; 
for one is inclined to say that the nuclear properties of an object determine 
its identity as a non-existent, not merely in the weak sense of distinguishing 
it from every other object, but also in the strong sense of being constitutive 
of the object, of  being essential to it as a non-existent. 
However, this is a question upon which Parsons is prepared to remain 
neutral. He is content to return to a former concern of his and merely to 
discuss the technical possibilities for maintaining some form of anti-essen- 
tialism within his formal theory (pp. 224-226).  But is this satisfactory? 
The question of the identity of non-existents in the strong or modal sense 
of that term really is of great importance. Nor is it clear that there is any 
viable alternative to the rigidity assumption. If the nuclear properties of a 
non-existent can vary, on what basis do they vary? Can Holmes in one world 
have the nuclear properties that Hamlet has in this world? If not, why not? 
If so, how? 
At one place (p. 187), Parsons gives us a clue as to his doubts over Rigidi- 
ty. He raises the question of whether Conan Doyle could have written slightly 
differently about Holmes or if he would thereby have been writing about a 
different character. Parsons declares himself unable to make up his mind on 
this question. Now if Conan Doyle could have written differently about 
Holmes, then, by the Link Hypothesis, Holmes would presumably have had 
different nuclear properties and so the rigidity assumption would fail. 
Such considerations do have some appeal; but it is hard to see how they 
can be worked up into a viable theory. There is first of  all a difficulty in 
allowing that Conan Doyle might have written differently about Holmes~ 
even if ever so slightly; for a slippery slope argument would seem to yield 
the counter-intuitive conclusion that Conan Doyle might have set down the 
text of Hamlet and still have been writing about Holmes. But even if this 
difficulty is set aside, perhaps as arising from some vagueness as to what 
object Holmes is, there is the further problem of determining the basis 
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upon which variation in nuclear properties is to be allowed. Presumably 
there are possible worlds in which Holmes is not written about (or other- 
wise invoked). But then what nuclear properties is Holmes to have in such 
worlds? It is no use saying "the nuclear properties Conan Doyle actually 
attributed to him", for that is to exhibit an unjustified bias towards the 
actual world. Nor can one say "no properties at all", since then distinct non- 
existents that were not written about in a given world would turn out to be 
identical. There are even problems in explaining the variation of nuclear 
properties in worlds in which the given non-existents are written about. 
Following an argument of Dan Hunter's ([3], p. 3), let us suppose that, on 
twin earth, another author had independently set down the text of the Conan 
Doyle stories. Then on Parsons' view, Conan Doyle and his twin would have 
been writing about the same characters, including a detective whom we may 
call 'Holmes'. Consider now a world in which Conan Doyle sets down a slight- 
ly different text, but his twin sets down the same text. Then they have written 
about distinct characters, say Holmes' and Holmes". But it may plausibly be 
argued that Holmes' and Holmes" are both identical to Holmes, thereby 
yielding a contradiction. For what character an author is writing about should 
not depend upon what other authors independently do. So since each author 
would have been writing about the same character in either world had the 
other author been absent, they must each be writing about the same character 
when the other author is present. 
Arguments such as these suggest that the view cannot be worked up into a 
viable theory. Nor does any other variational view seem plausible; and I there- 
fore propose that the Rigidity Assumption be accepted. 
The second question concerns whether objects such as Holmes might have 
existed. On this question, Parsons again declares neutrality: he is "not at all 
sure what the right answer should be" (p. 186). But again it seems to me 
there are compelling reasons for getting off the fence and rejecting the 
possible existence of such objects as Holmes. 
Let us agree to call an object fictitious ff it is the kind of  object that can 
be native to a story or other such context. (This is the broad sense of the 
term. We might reserve the term 'fictional' for the narrow sense of being 
native to some work of fiction.) It is not necessary that a fictitious object 
can be native to a story or context, but it must then be of the same kind as 
other objects that can be so native. So the question is whether fictitious 
objects can exist. Now in considering such questions, it is often helpful to 
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reverse the roles of the actual and the given possible world. So instead of 
asking whether a fictitious object of this world could be an existent of 
another world, we ask whether an existent of  this world could be a fictitious 
object of another world. Could you, or I, or the Eiffel Tower, have been the 
kind of object that is introduced in a work of fiction? When put like this, 
the answer seems clearly to be no. Surely, even when I do not exist. I am not 
the kind of object that an author creates in writing a work of fiction. Parsons 
begins his book with the dedication: To my parents, without whom I might 
have been one, But this may be a bad beginning; for in the relevant sense of 
'non-existent' as fictitious, the dedication would appear to be false. 
This intuition is further confirmed by argument. First, the property of  
being fictitious would appear to be a categorical property of an object. It 
says what sort of thing the object is and hence applies essentially to it. Now, 
necessarily, no fictitious object exists. So if a fictitious object could exist, it 
would still be fictitious and hence not exist. Therefore no fictitious object 
can exist. 
Secondly, consider a fictitious object, such as Holmes, that is introduced 
in a story or other context. Suppose that Holmes were identical to a possible 
existent y. Now presumablyy and the activity by which Holmes is introduced, 
Conan Doyle's story telling, could both exist in some possible world. It seems 
reasonable that, in such a world, Holmes should still be introduced in the 
story, since the relevant activity is the same. But then we have the absurd 
situation in which an existent is introduced in a story. This absurdity becomes 
even more apparent if we take the view, later to be defended, that authors 
literally create the objects introduced in their stories; since then we would 
have an author creating, through his story telling, an existent character. 
But even if one is unmoved by these essentialist considerations, there 
remains the difficulty of saying, in case of fictitious object can exist, which 
possible existent it is identical to. Presumably, any such identity must hold 
in virtue of  some sort of agreement between what is true of the fictitious 
object in its story, should there be one, and what is true of the possible 
existent in the different possible worlds. But, as several philosophers have 
pointed out, 14 there is in general no unique possible existent which can be 
identified with the fictitious object in this way. This difficulty becomes 
compounded if, as will later be argued for, it is allowed that the same proper- 
ties may be true of two distinct fictitious objects in their respective stories; 
for even if we fix on the possible existent, there will still remain an indeter- 
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minacy as to which of the fictitious objects it is to be identified with. 
To this argument it may be objected that it only shows that a typical fic- 
titious object is not a possible existent, but it leaves open the possibility that 
every possible existent is a fictitious object. One is inclined to think that if 
one fictitious object can exist then every fictitious object can exist. But there 
may be a fundamental difference, though not one of kind, among fictitious 
objects in this respect. 
There have in recent times been two traditions of though that have espoused 
an ontology of non-existents: the Meinongian; and the modal. The First has 
found a home for its objects in the intent ional-  in thoughts, beliefs and 
dreams; the other has found a home for its objects in the possible - in the 
unrealized possibilities or possible worlds. For some reason, the modal 
tradition has been considered more respectable (perhaps because it has a 
better worked out theory); and so the attempt has usually been to reduce 
Meinongian objects to possibilia. Against such a reduction, the above argument 
would appear to succeed. But one might equally well attempt to fred a place 
for the possible within Meinongian ontology; indeed, this appears to be 
Parsons' strategy. And against such a reduction, the above argument would 
seem to have little force. 
There is, indeed, a specific way in which Parsons might attempt to bring 
off  the reduction of the modal to the Meinongian ontology. He might suppose 
that each possible existent y is identical to the non-existent x whose nuclear 
properties are those that y has essentially. This is, in effect to treat existents 
as if they necessarily had the nuclear properties that they had essentially. 
There would then be no danger of identifying two possible existents, since 
each possible existent y would be distinguished by its necessary possession of 
the nuclear property XNx(x = y) of  being identical to y. 
Although this reduction may be more attractive than the one in the other 
direction, there are still objections to it and others like it. Suppose that the 
possible existent y exists in the world v, but not in the world w. By an 
innocuous extension of object abstraction, there is an object x that has in w 
exactly those nuclear properties that y has in v. Then x does not exist in w; 
for y will have the property XNx (p is true) in v, for any true proposition p 
of v, and it is only in w that an existent can have all such properties. It now 
seems reasonable to conclude that x has in v exactly the nuclear properties 
that x has in w. If x is non-existent in w, then this follows by the previous 
rigidity assumption. On the other hand, if x is existent in w, it seems that 
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x should at least have in w the nuclear properties that it has in v; but then 
it cannot have more, since y has in w each nuclear property or its nuclear 
negation, and no existent can have both. Since x has in w exactly the nuclear 
properties y has in v, it follows by Parsons' identity axiom that they are the 
same. Now the choice of the world v in this argument was arbitrary. As long 
as y was not a world-bound individual, we could have chosen another world 
v' in which y would have existed and would have had different nuclear 
properties. But then the same argument would have yielded the identity o f y  
to an object x '  that had in w exactly file nuclear properties y had in v'. Since 
x and x'  have different nuclear properties, they are distinct. So y is identical 
to two distinct objects - a contradiction. 
The above argument depends upon two rigidity assumptions: the original 
assumption that a non-existent retains its nuclear properties on staying non- 
existent; and the further assumption that a non-existent retains its nuclear 
properties on becoming existent. Parsons might, of course, reject either 
assumption. But it would then not be clear what to put in their place. Nor 
need it be clear how the identification might otherwise proceed. If, for 
example, the nuclear properties of a non-existent could vary from world to 
world, there would be no guarantee that a possible existent could be identi- 
fied with a non-existent on the basis of a fixed class of nuclear properties. 
So we see that the possibility of a Meinongian reduction cannot be main- 
tained and that even the possible existence of a special subclass of the fic- 
tional objects must be rejected. 
If this is done, it will have important consequences both for object theory 
in general and for Parsons' theory in particular. For one thing, it will now be 
appropriate to introduce a new predicate, say F, for being fictional in addi- 
tion to the predicate E for existence. Every fictional object will be non- 
existent; but not every non-existent will be fictional. Thus there will be a 
tripartite division of the objects, at any one world, into the existent, the fic- 
tional, and the possibly existent. We might use the term 'non-existent' for the 
fictional objects. But then it must be recognised that not every object which 
does not exist is nonexistent. 
Once the language is expanded in this way, a rigidity assumption for the 
new predicate should be laid down to the effect that, necessarily, any tic- 
tional object is necessarily fictional ([3Vx[3(Fx D U3Fx)). What this means 
is that the domain of fictional objects is constant from world to world. 
Combined with the previous rigidity assumption (with F in place of - E ) ,  
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it has the consequence that, necessarily, any fictional object necessarily 
has the nuclear properties that it has (I--1VxVP((Fx A Px)D l-qPx). Thus 
together the two axioms state that each world is the same in regard to the 
domain of fictional objects and their nuclear properties. 
Acceptance of the rigidity assumptions now has consequences for the non- 
modal part of  the theory. If  y is a possible existent that exists in v but not 
in w, there will be an object x that is fictional in w and that has in w exactly 
the nuclear properties that y has in v. By the rigidity assumptions, x will be 
fictional in w and will have in w the same nuclear properties as y.  
This will mean, first of all, that the axiom of object identity is too strong: 
for it will predict that x and y are identical; whereas, since one is fictional 
and the other not, they are distinct. We can still say that fictional objects 
with the same nuclear properties are the same; and we can still say that 
existent objects with the same nuclear properties are the same (which is a 
consequence, in any case, of  the abstraction principles for properties). But 
what we cannot always do is to distinguish between existent and fictional 
objects in terms of their nuclear properties. The mere fact that an object 
has the extra-nuclear property of being existent or being fictional may be 
required to distinguish it from other subjects. 
The example involving x and y also indicates that the abstraction axiom 
for objects is too weak: for it can only give us some object in w with the 
nuclear properties possessed by y in v; but what we want is a fictional object 
with those properties. So the abstraction axiom should be stated to read: 
For any condition, there is a fictional object whose nuclear 
properties are those satisfying the condition; 
and similarly for the relational forms of the axiom. 
It is interesting that similar modifications to the axioms may be prompted 
by considerations of a different sort altogether. In our discussion of correlates, 
it was suggested that objects should be capable of a non,circular individuation 
in terms of their nuclear properties or relations. Now such an extended 
principle is eminently plausible for fictional objects; but it is highly contro- 
versial for existents, involving, as it does, a commitment to a substantial form 
of Leibniz's principle of the identity of  indiscernibles. So we may be lead, 
through this reason, to restrict the application of the identity axion to fic- 
tional objects. Again, in our discussion of the paradoxes, it was suggested that 
it should only be a set of nuclear properties that defines an object, not an 
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arbitrary class. However, it may plausibly be argued that the nuclear proper- 
ties possessed by an existent should form a proper class. 1 s So the abstraction 
principle may, for this reason, be strengthened to the claim that each set of 
properties determines a fictional or, at least, a non existent object. 
Finally we may note that, with the modification to the identity and 
abstraction axioms, Parsons' requirement that the domain of objects be 
constant from world to world (pp. 99-101)  is in need of serious qualifica- 
tion. We can take the domain of objects at each world to consist of the 
existent, the fictional and possible. The domain will then be constant from 
world to world, but the identity and abstraction principles will not apply in 
any straightforward way to the possibles. On the other hand, we can take the 
domain at each world to consist of the existent and the fictional objects. 
Something like Parsons" principles will then apply to the objects so determined, 
but the domain will not be constant from world to world. 
Parsons falls into the common error of supposing that all non-existents are 
of  the same kind. The attempts to identify fictional with possible objects or 
possible with fictional objects are, in their own way, also symptoms of this 
error. It must be recognised,however, that the non-existents do not constitute 
an amorphous nothingness. Like existents, they come in classes of  radically 
different kinds. They are called upon to play very different roles and, in those 
roles, are governed by very different principles. 
We come now to the radical or external criticisms of Parsons' theory. It 
will be argued that each of the three main planks of  his theory - the abstrac- 
tion axiom, the identity axiom, and the nuclear/extra-nuclear distinction - 
should go. Fuller versions of the first two criticism can be found in [2], Sec- 
tion E 1-2 .  
7. PLATONISM 
Parsons' theory naturally goes with the view that fictitious objects are neces- 
sary creatures, that it is not an empirical matter that there is such an object 
as Holmes. For the only plausible way of maintaining the contrary, given that 
the quantifiers are to range over what fictitious objects there are, is to have 
there being a fictitious object dependent upon its being introduced in a story 
or related context; the object must, as it were, be empirically realized. But 
the application of object abstraction will generally yield many non-existents 
that are not in this way realized. 
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However, this abstract or platonic conception of fictitious objects runs 
counter to our ordinary judgement that fictional characters are created by 
their authors. For to create is to bring into being. So how can an author 
create a character if the character would have been there regardless of what 
he did? 
Philosophers have usually been uneasy with the ordinary view of the 
matter; and Parsons is no exception. In talking of an author creating char- 
acters, he puts scare quotes around the word (p. 51) and refers to a "popular 
sense" (p. 188). He suggests that what we mean when we ordinarily say that 
an author creates an object is that he makes it fictional. 
But this will not do; to bestow a property on an object that is already 
there, no matter how honorific the property, is not to create the object. 
To create is to bring into being. What philosophers such as Parsons must do is 
to explain how, in making our ordinary judgements about the creation of 
fictional objects, we are prepared to afftrm what is false or prepared to use 
the word 'create' in a special sense. I myself doubt that any adequate explana- 
tion is forthcoming and would prefer to see our ordinary judgements taken 
as data for our theory to explain. 
If we follow this line, then Parsons' abstraction axiom for objects must go. 
Instead, there being a fictional object must be made to depend upon its 
being empirically realised. The identity axiom could still be retained. But 
there would then be an uneasy tension in the theory; for the identity of a 
fictional object would have one source, its nuclear properties, while the 
being of the object would have another source, its empirical story or con- 
text. It would be preferable to have a unified account of the identity and 
being of the objects. 
The creationist view also makes for difficulties in the modal part of the 
theory. In our re-styled version of the modal part, we represented the domain 
of fictitious objects as being constant from world to world. This must now be 
given up. There will be a fictitious object such as Holmes in the domain of a 
given world only so long as Conan Doyle (or perhaps another author) does 
the right things. Thus the objects at any one world will now unfold, according 
to a fourfold division, into the actually existent, the possibly existent, the 
actually fictional and the possibly fictional. The category of fictional objects, 
like the category of existents, will split up into the actual and the possible. 
The creationist view, f'mally, has relevance to an issue that has long be- 
devilled thinkers in the Meinongian tradition. Do fictional or other non- 
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existent objects have any kind of being? Meinong was torn on this question, 
but tended to the view that they do not (the doctrine of Aussersein). On the 
other hand, the early Russell thought that non-existents must have some kind 
of being. In more recent times, Routley [8] has inveighed heavily against the 
Russellian position, while Parsons declares himself unable to fred anything 
more than a "terminological issue" here (p. 10). On a creationist view, how- 
ever, there is a clear and compelling reason for ascribing being to fictional 
objects; for an object could not be created unless it could pass, in some 
appropriate sense of the term, from non-being to being. 
8. I N T E R N A L I S M  
Internalism is the doctrine that fictitious objects can be individuated in 
terms of their internal content, the properties or relations ascribed to them in 
the stories or contexts in which they are introduced. Parsons is committed 
to internalism. For suppose that two distinct objects were indistinguishable 
in terms of their internal content. By the Link Hypothesis, they could not be 
distinguished in terms of their nuclear properties; and so by the identity 
axiom, they would be the same. 
There are, however, various objections to the internalist position. One is 
that two authors could independently write stories with the same content. 
On Parsons' view, the native characters of either story would be the same; but 
the intuitive view is that they are not. Tiffs intuition is supported by our talk 
of creation. For each author creates his characters. So assuming one author 
wrote first, how could the other author create what was already created? 
Parsons considers this objection and says, in reply, that the situation is 
no worse than when two authors independently write (or create) the same 
story (p. 188). Now there may be a sense of 'story' in which we have the 
same story here. But what is created, it seems to me, is different for the 
two authors. Indeed, we can imagine that each story was the start of two 
quite separate literary traditions. Each tradition would then have its origin 
in a story created by its own author, but not in the story created by the other 
author. Thus Parsons' example does not give any support for a sense of 
'create' in which we may talk of creating an object that is akeady created. 
Another objection concerns indiscernible objects from within the same 
story or context. Perhaps the clearest example of this sort is a picture of a 
symmetric universe. We may suppose that the picture is realised on a surface 
i34 KIT F I N E  
of a sphere and is symmetric about two hemispheres. Each object portrayed 
on the one hemisphere will be distinct from its counterpart portrayed on the 
other hemisphere and yet indiscernible within the picture from it. 
Parsons considers similar examples in Chapter 7.5 (pp. 190-194), but his 
ways of getting round them are not really applicable to the present case. We 
cannot distinguish the objects in terms of the names that they have in the 
picture (of. pp. 192-193),  since the picture gives no names to the objects. 
Nor is it part of the picture that this blob portrays this object, that blob the 
other object. It also cannot be plausibly argued that the picture is really 
about a pair of objects, but not about its individual members. If there had 
been a slight discrepancy in the second hemisphere, we would have been 
under no temptation to say this. But a small variation on the one hemisphere 
can hardly make a difference as to whether a specific object is portrayed on 
the other hemisphere. 
Another response, not considered by Parsons, is that the one object x has 
the property of being identical to x in the picture, while the other object y 
does not. (A similar response might be given in the two authors case.) But 
against this, it may first be protested that the theory is most reasonably 
taken to provide a non-circular means of individuating non-existents. More- 
over, if the objects x and y could only be distinguished in terms of their 
identity properties, it would be a complete mystery, as I have already pointed 
out, why a given blob on the sphere should portray the one object x rather 
than the other object y .  
But even without the requirement that individuation be non-circular, 
there will still be counter-examples against the original form of the identity 
axiom. Imagine a story in which two characters x and y are symmetrically 
placed. Although the characters are distinct, it may be left open in the story 
that they are distinct. It might further be supposed that the story is a logical 
fantasy in which objects are not self-identical. There would then appear to be 
no properties at all, circular or not, by which the two objects might be 
distinguished in the story. 
If these examples are accepted, then either the Link Hypothesis or the 
identity axiom (in its circular or non-circular form) must go. But if the Link 
Hypothesis goes, we are left with no basis for ascertaining the nuclear proper- 
ties of fictional objects. Therefore the only plausible alternative is the rejec- 
tion of the identity axiom. 
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9. L I T E R A L I S M  
In most ordinary contexts of discourse, it is acceptable to assert that Sherlock 
Holmes is a detective, that he lived in Baker Street, and that he smoked 
opium. According to what I call the literalist view, what makes these asser- 
tions acceptable is that they are true. Moreover, these truths are of a straight- 
forward subject-predicate kind. The relevant predicates are simply true of the 
object named, without any qualification as to the story being implicitly 
understood and without any special sense being attached to the predicates, is 
Parsons seems to presuppose the truth of literalism throughout most of 
the book. But the relationship between his theory and literalism is hard to 
ascertain, since it is no part of the formal development of the theory that 
literalism should be true. It may therefore be worthwhile to work out more 
exactly what the relationship is. 
One connection is that the theory may be used to explain the truth of 
the literalist judgements. Why is it true that Sherlock Holmes is a detective or 
that he lived in Baker Street? Parsons may supply the answer: because Holmes 
is the object that it is. The rule for identifying a story object, the Link Hypo- 
thesis, takes it to be the object whose nuclear properties are those attributed 
to it in the story. Since Holmes is said to be a detective in the Conan Doyle 
story, it will be part of his identity that he is a detective. 
However, it seems to me that a much tighter connection can be made out; 
for something like Parsons' theory seems to be needed to sustain the literalist 
doctrines. We require, first of all, a general formulation of which literalist 
judgements are true. Now the immediate basis for the truth of a literalist 
proposition is the truth of that same proposition (or a related one) in a story 
or other context. But not all propositions true in a story or context can be 
taken to be true in reality. For one thing, this goes against the facts: we do 
not take Sherlock Holmes to exist because he exists in the Conan Doyle 
stories. But also, it is theoretically untenable: the propositions true in different 
stories, or even in the same story, may be inconsistent with one another and 
with what else we take to be true. 
So which truths of a story do we take to be exportable into the real 
world? The only natural answer, at least in the case of propositions of subject- 
predicate form, is that it depends upon the object and property referred to. 
As long as the object is native to the story and the property is of the right 
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sort, then the proposition will be exportable; otherwise it will not be (though 
it may, for other reasons, turn out to be true). 
Thus the need to fred some barrier to exportation leads naturally to the 
nuclear/extra nuclear distinction. Indeed, the existence of a barrier can be 
used as a basis for defining the distinction. For let us say that a property is 
exportable if any object native to a story or other context will have that 
property, and will only have that property, in virtue of having it in the story 
or context. Then the nuclear properties may simply be defined as the im- 
portable ones. 
It  may be a defect of this definition that it uses the phrase 'in virtue of'. 
But in particular applications, the phrase will have a clear meaning; and in 
most of them, it will be dispensable. For we may take an exportable proper- 
ty to be one that any object native to a story or context has just in case the 
object has it in the story or context. It is then only in the most freakish or 
abnormal cases that an object exportable in the one sense will not be im- 
portable in the other. 
The possibility of defining nuclearity in this way is no small thing. Parsons 
devotes some effort to explaining the distinction between nuclear and extra- 
nuclear properties (pp. 22 -26 ,  72 -78 ,166 -174 ) .  But his explanations leave 
room for considerable doubt over the coherence of the distinction. What we 
can show is that, once the truth of  literalism is granted, a clear and coherent 
distinction can be drawn along the lines that Parsons intends. 
This is not necessarily to say that the distinction is thereby explained in 
the most fundamental terms. Taking the nuclear properties to be the export- 
able ones means that the Link Hypothesis becomes a triviality. But presumably 
we want the nuclear/extra-nuclear distinction to pertain most directly to the 
intrinsic nature of the properties; it is because of this intrinsic nature that 
some properties are exportable and others are not. It was perhaps in order to 
maintain the non-triviality of the Link Hypothesis that Parsons did not avail 
himself of the above characterization of the distinction (though it may also 
have been to maintain a neutral position on its truth). 
The existence of an exportation barrier gives rise to, and serves to character- 
ize, the nuclear/extra-nuclear distinction. But it does not, in itself, give rise 
to anything like Parsons' characteristic axioms for the identity and abstrac- 
tion of objects. These may be seen to arise, not from the demand for a general 
formulation of which literalist judgements are true, but from the demand 
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for an explanation of why they should be true. A native object will have 
those nuclear properties that it has in its story. But why should it have those 
properties, and not others? 
There are various answers that might be given to this question. But one of 
the most plausible makes the truth of literalist judgements turn upon the 
identity of the object in question. Nuclear properties are taken to define non- 
existent objects. The rule for determining the identity of an object of a story, 
in case it is not immigrant, is that it be the object defined by the appropriate 
cluster of nuclear properties. But this seems to presuppose both that the 
object is already there (the abstraction axiom) and that it thereby be unique- 
ly determined (the identity axiom). So literalism, while not actually implying 
a Parsonian theory, gives it a great deal of plausibility. 
But what if literalism is taken to be false? How then does the theory fare? 
Certainly, it would lose part of its point. Since there would be no literal/st 
truths, there would be no such truths to explain. But still the theory would 
have some point. The problems of ontology and identity would remain; 
it would need to be explained which objects there were and what they were. 
How the theory would do in these remaining respects would depend 
critically upon the interpretation of the nuclear/extra nuclear distinction. 
Suppose the distinction is taken with its intended application to ordinary 
language, so that predicates like 'is a detective', 'is blue', 'is tall', are taken 
to be nuclear, while the others, such as 'exists' or 'is mythical', are not. It 
then seems that the theory must be rejected. For ordinary fictional objects, 
such as Watson or Holmes, must be distinguished in terms of their nuclear 
properties. But if literalism were false, it would appear that no nuclear proper- 
ties could be true of either Watson or Holmes and so there would be no basis 
for distinguishing them. 
On the other hand, the nuclear/extra-nuclear distinction could be regarded 
in a purely formal light, interpretable in any way consistent with the axioms 
of a theory. There would then seem to exist two main ways of re-interpreting 
the distinction - the contextual and the abstract. 
On the first, the nuclear weakening pN of P is taken to be the property of 
an object's either existing and having P or not existing and having P in the 
context in which it is introduced (cf. pp. 202-203).  We may now make some 
reasonable assumptions about objects and contexts, as in [2]. The main ones, 
crudely put, are that: 
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- For any class of properties, there is an object and a context such that 
the object is native to that context and has in that context exactly the proper- 
ties of the class; 
-Objec ts  with the same properties in the contexts to which they are 
native are the same. 
Under the proposed interpretation, the basic axioms of the Parsonian theory 
may then be derived as theorems in the contextualJst theory. 
But despite the possibility of interpreting the contextualist within the 
Parsonian theory, there are some basic differences between the two theories 
under their intended interpretations. First, the two theories will be extended 
differently. In particular, on the contextual theory, every 'nuclear' property 
pN should be extra-nuclear, and hence the operation of nuclear weakening is 
indefinitely iterable; but this is not so on the Parsonian theory. Second,the 
ultimate basis for the axioms will be different on the two theories. On the 
Parsonian theory, the principle that an extra-nuclear property agrees with its 
nuclear weakening on existents represents a fundamental fact either about the 
operation of nuclear weakening or about the operation of nuclear abstraction, 
should nuclear weakening be explained in terms of it. But on the contextualist 
theory, it is triviality under the proposed re-interpretation of nuclear weaken- 
ing. Finally, and most importantly, the two theories offer very different con- 
ceptions of objects and of how the basic problems facing a theory of objects 
are to be solved. The Parsonian theory conceives of objects as independent of 
the contexts in which they occur; the basic principles of abstraction and of 
identity are stated without reference to such contexts. On the other hand, the 
contextualist theory conceives of objects as locked into the contexts in which 
they occur; the abstraction and identity principles are stated with essential 
reference to those contexts. 
The other, "abstract", interpretation of the Parsonian theory consists in 
supposing that all of the properties expressed in ordinary language are extra- 
nuclear but that, nevertheless, the nuclear weakenings of those properties 
exist at an abstract or theoretical level. To understand this interpretation 
better, suppose that the Parsonian theory correctly applied to ordinary 
language. Now imagine that all devices for expressing nuclear abstractions 
or nuclear weakenings were excised from the language and that syntactically 
simple nuclear predicates were taken to be automatically false of non-existents. 
In such a language, all nuclear properties would go unexpressed. But from the 
standpoint of our language, it would be reasonable to suppose that the nuclear 
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weakenings of the properties expressed in that language still existed. Transfer 
now this hypothesis to our actual language, and you have the present inter- 
pretation. 
Such an interpretation does,indeed,make the Parsonian theory compatible 
with an anti-literalist stand, at least in regard to the predicates of ordinary 
language. But it makes the nuclear properties unnecessarily metaphysical. Our 
only access to those properties is through the role they play in the individua- 
tion and determination of objects. But that role is equally well served by the 
contextualist theory; and so the whole apparatus of nuclear properties can 
drop out as so much idle machinery. What gives the Parsonian theory the edge 
over the contextualist theory is its capacity to explain the literalist truths. 
Without those truths, that explanatory edge disappears. 
So we see that there is an intimate connection between Parsons' theory 
and literalism. If literalism is true, it can be used to sustain the nuclear/extra- 
nuclear distinction and provides some evidence for the rest of Parsons' theory. 
If literalism is false, then the nuclear/extra-nuclear distinction, as it is ordinarily 
understood, must go. The only way to save the Parsonian theory is to subject 
the distinction to radical re-interpretation, either by postulating nuclear 
properties at the purely metaphysical level or by conceiving them in con- 
textualist terms. 
In the light of its importance, both for Parsons' theory and object theory 
in general, it is surprising that the doctrine of literalism has not been discussed 
further. Parsons says little (pp. 53-54) ,  and others not much more. This is 
hardly the place to debate its merits, but I can briefly hint at the reasons I 
think the doctrine false. The central question is whether ordinary predicates 
such as 'detective' or 'dagger' can sometimes be true of non-existents. A great 
deal of the linguistice evidence favours the literalist view; but there is some 
with which it is hard to reconcile. Macbeth asked: "Is this a dagger that I see 
before me?" Now, assuming this is a situation from real life, it seems reason- 
able to suppose that Macbeth could have been wrong in his answer to this 
question, that if he had in the perceptual situation, taken the object that he 
saw to be a dagger, then his belief would have been mistaken. But on literalist 
views, it is hard to see how Macbeth could have made a mistake. If he had 
taken the object to be a dagger then, by the appropriate form of the Link 
Hypothesis, applied now to perceptions, the object would have been a dagger 
and so his belief that it was a dagger would have been correct. 
The literalist might say, in response to this example, that the word 'dagger' 
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is being used in a special sense, to mean what we would ordinarily mean by 
'real dagger'. Now there is, indeed, a use of  the term 'dagger' that seems to 
favour the literalist's case. Even if Macbeth is apprised of  the true state of  
affairs, he might say, on a recurrence of the incident: "I saw that dagger 
again." But it seems to me that it is this use of  the word that should be 
regarded as special, and not the other; it is this use that would be guarded by 
scare-quotes, if either were. 
If  Parsons' theory fails on these three counts of  platonism, internalism and 
literalism, what is to be put in its place? My own view might be summed up 
in the words: fictitious objects are essentially objects of reference. This 
means, first of  all, that there can be no fictional object without a mark or 
symbol by which it is introduced. It means, secondly, that fictional objects 
are essentially tied to those marks - no fictional object without the particular 
mark by which it is introduced. Such a view avoids the pitfalls of  Parsons' 
position. It fits in well with creationist and externalist doctrines: for we may 
say that a fictitious object is created through its mark being created; and we 
may allow that fictitious objects with the same internal content should be 
introduced by different marks. The view, though neutral on literalism, is 
not  required to give it a central place in the determination and individuation 
of  fictitious objects; literalism, if true, may be regarded as a quirk of  language 
without any essential bearing on the identity of objects. Finally, the view is 
suggestive of  an anti-realist position, one according to which features of  fic- 
titious objects are ultimately to be explained in terms of  features of their 
marks. 
NOTES 
* I should like to thank Terence Parsons for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this review. 
i Others include Castafieda [ 1], Rappaport [7], Routley [8] and Z alta [ 9 ]. 
These two approaches are also desen'bed in Chapter 1.2 of Zalta's [9]. 
3 The reader should note that I have departed from Parsons' notation in two respects. 
I have used capitals, rather than lower-case letters, for nuclear relations; and I have 
used R N or R, instead of w(+R), for the nuclear weakening. I find my own notation 
easier on the eye. 
4 I here must assume that XNxg(x) = hNx~(x)  f f  hxg(x)  = h x ~ ( x ) .  If the definition 
is to be applicable to all properties, I must also assume that each property is of the form 
hx~o(x). 
In the sequel, I shall tacitly make these and related assumptions. However, the whole 
topic of the identity of properties is a vexed one and earmot properly be dealt with here. 
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s This. in its turn, follows from the assumption that each nuclear property P is of the 
form hNx~(x); for then P is the nuclear weakening of hxr 
6 Again, the correctness of this definition depends upon certain assumptions. Its universal 
applicability also depends upon the assumption that all properties are of the form hx~  (x). 
In making this intuitive distinction, I appear to be disputing the theory of property 
identity briefly proposed on pp. 109-110.  
T The symbolic formulation of the statement is 3x3y3RVP[(Px=-P = [Ry]) A (Py =- 
P = [xR])].  I omit the proof of  its underivability. Parsons (p. 194) claims that  the 
related formula 3 x 3 y 3 R ( x  ~ y A ~E!x  A ~E! y A x[Ry] A [xR]y) is underivable. 
This is true, even when the inner conjuncts ~E!x  and ~E!y  are dropped. It is, however, 
a rather trivial defect in the system and arises merely from the fact that the system 
cannot prove the existence of  two nuclear properties. If there were only one nuclear 
property, x[Ry] A [xR]y would imply x =y ,  since x and y would then bo th  possess 
all nuclear properties. On the other hand, under the assumption that there are two 
nuclear properties (which follows from there being at least one existent), Parsons' formula 
can be derived. (Let 'x '  have all nuclear properties and let 'y '  have just [xR ] as a nuclear 
property.) Our own underivability result points to a more fundamental defect in the 
system and cannot be mended by means of such a simple extension to its axioms. 
8 A general case might be made out for adding such a primitive to theories of  properties 
and the like. One could then def'me interesting notions, such as purity, and formulate 
interesting principles concerning objectual content, without going to the length of giving 
a full account of the identity of the intensional entities in question. 
9 Let xSCorRY abbreviate VP[(Px---P = [Ry] )A  (Py-=-P = [xR])] .  Then the formula 
VR Vx, y, u, v[(x ~ y A u ~ v A x SCorRY A u SCorRY) ~ (x = u A y = v)] cannot be 
proved within Parsons' system. 
10 I do not have an answer to Parsons' 'exercise' on p. 238. But if therewere an inter- 
pretation of the stipulated sort, it could not contain a predicate constant satisfying the 
conditions required of  conceivability; for in view of our revised formulation of  the 
paradox, there can be no predicate constant C for which VxVy(CxACy A x +y  D 
[Rx] ~ [Ry] ) is true in the interpretation for any given predicate constant R. For this 
reason, the existence of the given interpretation is hardly sufficient to establish the 
consistency of  Parsons' proposal. 
n A similar criticism applies to the system constructed in [9]. Even if the system 
should turn out to be consistent, it is still not clear what the underlying conception of 
objects is. 
12 Indeed, at one point (p. 234), he says that one must "either maintain that g [the 
function from x to [Rx] ] is not, after all, a one-one function, or give up the correlation 
of objects with sets of  nuclear properties". But he means, of  course, not sets, but  classes 
or conditions. 
~3 I am actually interested in the stronger claim that [] V x n  VPI~ ((~Ex A Px) 
[] (~Ex D Px)). But as is usual in the discussion of modal matters, such subtleties will 
be ignored. 
~4 See Kripke [5], pp. 763-765 ,  Kaplan [4], pp. 505-506 ,  and Plantinga [6], pp. 
154-155 .  Strictly speaking, Kaplan and Plantinga only argue against the linguistic 
thesis that  fictional names refer to possible existents, bu t  their arguments may be modi- 
fied so as to apply to the ontological thesis that fictional objects are not identical to 
possible existents. 
is The argument goes as follows: the nuclear properties must form a proper class, or 
else the paradoxes could be derived. Now each existent will have a nuclear property 
hNx~o(x) or its internal negation hNx ~~(x). Granted that the negations of distinct 
nuclear properties are distinct, there will then be a one-one correspondence between 
the nuclear properties possessed by the existent and all nuclear properties. Therefore 
the nuclear properties possessed by the existent will also form a proper class. 
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i~ Crispin Wright has pointed out to me that this formulation of the issue presupposes 
that the anti-literalist make use of an external concept of truth. For even he would 
admit that when it is acceptable to say that Holmes is a detective, there is a sense of 
~true' in which it is also acceptable to say that it is true that Holmes is a detective. How- 
ever, I shall not consider to what extent the issue can be formulated without using the 
external concept of truth. 
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